Introduction
============

The human face conveys information regarding a person's identity (e.g., [@B74]; [@B42]), emotional state (e.g., [@B31]; [@B77]), gender (e.g., [@B16]), age (e.g., [@B40]), and direction of attention (e.g., [@B70]). This information is rapidly filtered so complex perceptual categorizations can be performed ([@B75]). Despite decades of research on how we extract various cues from faces, it is still widely debated whether identity and expression information is processed and represented within shared or independent systems.

One way to approach this question is to examine the type of basic visual information (e.g., spatial frequency ranges or spatial location of diagnostic cues) and perceptual processes (e.g., holistic and featural or analytic processing) that are used to make identity and expression judgments. Studies examining the effect of spatial frequency (i.e., coarse vs. fine visual information) do not show a strict dissociation between expression and identity judgments: although certain spatial frequency bands may be more conducive to identification or detection of individual emotions (e.g., [@B26]; [@B38]; [@B54]), or may be used preferentially for different tasks (e.g., [@B74]; [@B27]); both high and low spatial frequency bands carry sufficient information to convey expression and identity information (e.g., [@B27]), and biases toward spatial frequency bands are not fixed ([@B74]). As such, spatial frequency bands cannot be taken to represent dissociable pathways of visual processing for expression and identity. However, techniques such as the "Bubbles" task ([@B42]) indicate that typical perceivers do focus or rely on subtly different areas of the face when making expression and identity judgments---for instance, perceivers use a variety of discrete facial regions for different expression judgments (e.g., [@B77]), whereas identity judgments rely on a more diffuse area of the face, encompassing the eyes, nose, and mouth ([@B42]; [@B73]). Taken together, these findings are consistent with the idea that facial identity information is processed in a holistic manner (see [@B57]; [@B64]; for a definition and discussion of holistic processing), encompassing both individual facial features and their precise spatial configuration; whereas expression judgments may rely more on processing of individual components or conjunctions of components. For example, research using the composite task has found that, in general, identity judgments rely quite strongly on the integration of information from the top and bottom halves of the face (see [@B69] for a review). Expression judgments also show this "composite effect," suggesting that expressions are also processed holistically, but some authors have suggested that this process is independent of or different from the holistic processing that occurs for identity ([@B22]; [@B85]). Furthermore, other studies have suggested that componential or part-based processing is more efficient, and hence the default route of visual processing, for expression judgments ([@B81]; see also [@B32]). In sum, then, expression and identity judgments may rely on subtly different visual cues and processing styles, with identity judgments making use of more diffuse spatial areas of the face and a processing style that integrates information from across these areas, and expression judgments relying on smaller spatial areas (incorporating one or two facial features) and a more piecemeal or componential processing style. While this gives some indication that identity and expression may make use of similar, or at least overlapping, visual information, it still leaves open the question of whether individuals access these visual cues or processing styles separately for different tasks, or whether they are irrevocably intertwined. As such, this paper focuses on research into neuropsychological case studies, and the contribution they can make to this debate.

Current face-processing models support the segregation of identity and expression mechanisms. Functional models posit that identity and expression information is processed independently, although some interaction may be mediated by the wider cognitive system (e.g., [@B17]; see Figure [1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}). Anatomical models (e.g., [@B45]; [@B41]) distinguish between static structural properties of the face that relate to a single person (e.g., the shape and spacing of the facial features provide information on facial identity: [@B76]), and dynamic variant information that is common to many individuals (e.g., positions of the muscles that convey an emotional state). Anatomically distinct brain regions are believed to analyze this information, with the lateral fusiform gyrus processing identity and the superior temporal sulcus (STS) expression (see Figure [2](#F2){ref-type="fig"}). While the anatomical model predicts this split occurs after an early stage of perceptual processing in the inferior occipital gyrus, other authors suggest this phase involves higher-level processing of both expression and identity ([@B21]; [@B61]). Both accounts are broadly consistent with the patterns of visual information use outlined above.

![**The cognitive model of face-processing proposed by [@B17]**.](fpsyg-06-00770-g0001){#F1}

![**An adaptation of the distributed model of face-processing proposed by [@B45]**.](fpsyg-06-00770-g0002){#F2}

Early evidence supporting the proposed independence of identity and expression processing (hereon termed "the independence hypothesis") came from a double dissociation between two neurological disorders. One half comes from individuals with prosopagnosia, who cannot recognize familiar people yet have preserved processing of facial expression (e.g., [@B82]). The other half comes from patients who are impaired at recognizing emotional expressions despite intact identification abilities (e.g., [@B86]; [@B49]). While the independence hypothesis remains a dominant aspect of cognitive and anatomical models, much behavioral (e.g., [@B34]; [@B11]; [@B23]) and neuroimaging (e.g., [@B37]; [@B36]) evidence has questioned the degree of separation between the two processes. Further, [@B21] discounted the traditional patient-based evidence supporting the independence hypothesis, positing that a single model can achieve independent coding of identity and expression using the different types of visual information described above.

Since the publication of [@B21] review, new patient reports have overcome the limitations of previous work. These papers also describe neuroanatomical data that complement behavioral performance, and some directly assess the use of perceptual information in expression and identity processing. Further, several developmental neuropsychological case studies have addressed the independence hypothesis. This paper summarizes the patient-based evidence reported since 2005, and presents a timely review of the contribution of neuropsychological case reports to the independence debate.

Acquired Deficits in Facial Identity Processing
===============================================

One half of the neuropsychological double dissociation traditionally believed to support the independence hypothesis comes from individuals with prosopagnosia. This condition typically results from occipitotemporal lesions ([@B9]), and is characterized by a severe impairment in facial identity recognition. In some cases expression recognition appears to be preserved (i.e., performance was within the range of typical age-matched controls; [@B82]; [@B58]; [@B86]; [@B80]), supporting the independence hypothesis. Yet, [@B21] argue that the bulk of this evidence should be discounted because the prosopagnosia is not visuoperceptual in origin, instead resulting from prosopamnesia (impaired recognition of faces encoded after but not before illness onset; e.g., [@B82]), general amnesia, or more general semantic impairments (e.g., [@B33]). In fact, the authors suggested that only two cases truly appeared to have visuoperceptual deficits ([@B18]; [@B82]), yet both investigations suffered from methodological or statistical limitations. The authors therefore concluded that no case of prosopagnosia published prior to their review provided convincing evidence in support of the independence hypothesis.

However, since 2005, further instances of prosopagnosia with preserved expression recognition have been described. [@B68] reported patient FB, who had damage to the right fusiform, right inferior temporal, right middle temporal and right inferior occipital gyri. FB had severe prosopagnosia yet scored within the typical range on an expression recognition test. Yet, the actual processing strategies used by FB were not assessed, and, in line with previous patient reports (e.g., [@B3]), the authors suggest that her normal performance on the expression task may be underpinned by atypical strategies. As mentioned above, expression processing may rely on both part-based analytical processing and some degree of holistic processing. While the possibility was not explicitly tested, the authors suggest that FB relied on part-based information to a greater extent than controls in the expression task, and could use this information to achieve a normal score (see also [@B13]).

[@B35] used more sensitive measures of identity and expression perception in four individuals with prosopagnosia, alongside a fMRI-based functional localizer that identified preserved and impaired cortical regions. All four patients had selective difficulties in facial identity recognition, and, consistent with the anatomical model ([@B45]), two had right inferotemporal lesions and two had damage within the anterior temporal lobes. Strikingly, the authors also described a fifth patient with selective damage to the posterior STS (pSTS), who presented with impaired expression recognition. Notably, however, these deficits extended to identity recognition when irrelevant variations in expression needed to be discounted. While evidence from the four prosopagnosic individuals supports the independence hypothesis, the latter participant suggests some overlap in the diagnostic facial information used in the two tasks, although exactly what diagnostic information (e.g., processing style; separate visual cues) is currently unclear.

Converging evidence comes from patient HJA, who acquired damage to the ventral occipital and temporal lobes and was unable to recognize facial identity or static facial expressions at normal levels ([@B50]), potentially due to abnormal use of visual information during static expression processing ([@B13]). However, HJA performed significantly better when identifying moving facial expressions ([@B50]) and when matching moving faces based on identity ([@B56]). Although this movement advantage did not extend to overt identification or face learning, HJA's use of movement cues in both identity and expression decisions suggests that (a) the neural mechanisms subserving facial movement processing---most likely the pSTS ([@B65], [@B66]; [@B71])---can facilitate both processes, and (b) these neural mechanisms can be dissociated from those involved in static face-processing. This latter hypothesis is encompassed within the anatomical model (see Figure [2](#F2){ref-type="fig"}), although the role of the pSTS in identity recognition is less clear. [@B60] suggest that the structure may also process "dynamic facial signatures" (characteristic patterns of motion that aid identification), although facial movement may also boost identity recognition by attracting attention and foveal fixation that guides stimulus-driven selective attention ([@B60]; [@B1]). Regardless, this information may contribute to both expression and identity judgments, yet a smaller influence on the latter may facilitate identification only under limited circumstances (e.g., when the individual has trouble processing static facial cues; see [@B60], for a discussion).

While increasing evidence supports independent mechanisms for dynamic and static facial information, there is less agreement about the stage at which this split occurs. [@B45] concur with [@B17] that the bifurcation occurs at an early stage (i.e., before the formation of view-independent structural descriptions in the functional model, and before processing in the lateral fusiform gyrus for identity and the STS for expression in the anatomical model). However, [@B62], [@B61]) posit a higher-order shared stage of processing that may involve holistic processing. A very recent report supports this hypothesis. [@B67] investigated the decoding of facial expression in patient PS, who had major lesions in the left mid-ventral and the right inferior occipital cortex, and minor lesions of the left posterior cerebellum and the right middle temporal gyrus. Previous work by [@B19] indicated that, in a facial identity task, PS used information in a sub-optimal manner, focusing on the mouth and external contours and avoiding the eye region. Yet, [@B67] found that PS used all the facial features to decode dynamic emotional expressions (with the exception of fear), and performed within the typical range when classifying those expressions. Despite this, PS had a general impairment in categorizing many static facial expressions, which, in line with the theory of [@B61], the authors attribute to the right inferior occipital gyrus lesion. They suggest that the preserved processing of dynamic expressions may occur via a direct and functionally distinct pathway connecting early visual cortex to the pSTS. Although this study did not investigate whether the patient also benefited from dynamic information in identity judgments, it indicates that the use of both dynamic and static information should be assessed in expression and identity tasks. Indeed, dissociable anatomic systems may exist for dynamic and static information, but there may be some overlap in the diagnostic information used for expression and identity judgments in each pathway.

Acquired Deficits in Facial Expression Recognition
==================================================

There are fewer reports of acquired deficits in expression processing and it is not always clear whether facial identity recognition has been preserved. There is also some variation in lesion location (which is sometimes under-specified), with early studies reporting expression recognition difficulties following diffuse bilateral damage ([@B55]), right ([@B2]) or left ([@B86]) hemisphere lesions, or selective amygdala damage ([@B6]; [@B15]). These reports may be reconciled by findings that perceptual and recognition processes may be independently affected, and this may be related to lesion location. Studies have demonstrated deficits in expression matching but not naming following right hemisphere damage ([@B86]), particularly to the right pSTS ([@B35], patient R-ST1). Conversely, deficits in expression naming and emotional memory have been reported following unilateral ([@B5]; [@B15]; [@B35], patient R-AT1) or bilateral ([@B15]) amygdala damage, respectively. Patient R-AT1 in [@B35] report showed no pSTS damage and no difficulty performing expression matching tasks, suggesting dissociable roles for the pSTS and amygdala in expression processing. These findings converge neatly with the anatomical model.

The studies reviewed above mostly relied on categorization performance rather than examination of processing strategy. One exception is [@B6] report of patient SM, who presented with amygdala damage and a selective deficit in fear recognition. In a later report, the authors found that she was unable to use diagnostic information from the eye region, irrespective of emotional expression ([@B3]). This had presented as a selective impairment in fear recognition because the eyes are the most important feature for identifying this emotion. As noted above for investigations examining individuals with prosopagnosia, categorization performance alone may obscure atypical use of visual information, influencing the theoretical conclusions that can be gleaned from patient reports.

Other criticisms suggest this half of the double dissociation has been over-simplified ([@B21]). Evidence suggests that a single processing stream cannot process all expressions, as dissociable neural systems have been identified for particular emotions (e.g., [@B53]; although it is not clear if these dissociations are based on the emotion itself or simply perceptual features that are embedded within that expression, see [@B84]). Instead, selective disruption of expression recognition may reflect damage to a more general emotion system ([@B21]). Indeed, facial expression impairments are often associated with deficits in decoding vocal expression for specific emotions ([@B79]; [@B22], [@B20]) and at a more general level ([@B4]).

Developmental Cases
===================

[@B21] rejected some patient-based evidence supporting the independence hypothesis on the grounds that it was developmental in origin. In line with other authors (e.g., [@B14]; [@B52]), they argue that individuals with developmental disorders may have had some form of atypical brain organization from birth. Thus, it is difficult to interpret developmental cases within cognitive models of the face-processing system, given that (a) the basic architecture of this system might not have developed, and (b) it is unknown if the system can be selectively disrupted in the same manner inferred for patients with acquired deficits. One could therefore argue that developmental rather than representational abnormalities provide a convincing explanation of the basis of face-processing impairments in these cases.

Despite these issues, several studies have investigated the independence hypothesis in developmental prosopagnosia. This disorder is typically viewed as a parallel condition to acquired prosopagnosia, and is similarly characterized by a severe and relatively selective deficit in facial identity recognition (e.g., [@B28]; [@B12]; [@B39]; [@B10]). However, these individuals have never experienced a brain injury, and do not have concurrent socio-emotional, intellectual or low-level perceptual difficulties. While some individuals with developmental prosopagnosia have deficits in facial expression recognition ([@B30]; [@B59]), others appear to have a selective deficit only affecting the recognition of facial identity ([@B29]; [@B51]). Notably, however, [@B62] reported 12 developmental prosopagnosics who displayed normal levels of accuracy on a series of facial expression recognition tests, yet presented with impaired holistic coding of both facial expression and facial identity. The authors interpreted this finding as evidence that the prosopagnosics were relying on atypical strategies to achieve normal performance on the expression tasks. Thus, further work that examines actual processing strategy rather than accuracy and response times alone is required to clarify whether facial expression recognition is truly unaffected in some individuals with developmental prosopagnosia.

Evidence of selectively impaired expression recognition has been reported in socio-developmental disorders (SDDs), but findings are mixed. Many studies fail to find group-level deficits, with individuals falling into both typical and atypical ranges (for reviews, see [@B44]; [@B83]). There is nevertheless some evidence that expression and identity processing can be dissociated (e.g., [@B47]), although particular emotions (e.g., fear and surprise: [@B7]; [@B51]) appear to be disproportionately affected. As noted for brain-damaged patients, this evidence again suggests that deficits in expression recognition may be related to emotional processing more than face-processing. For instance, recent work suggests that facial ([@B24]) and vocal ([@B46]) affect recognition deficits in autism may be attributed to co-occurring alexithymia rather than autism itself. Case reports of individuals with developmental visuoperceptual deficits in expression recognition without a concurrent SDD would provide more convincing evidence to support the independence hypothesis, yet no known case has been reported to date. This is unsurprising given that several authors suggest that facial expression recognition impairments inevitably lead to deficits in socio-emotional functioning, which may in turn lead to impairments in facial identity recognition (e.g., [@B72]).

More consistent findings suggesting atypical processing of facial expression have been observed in studies that examine the use of diagnostic facial information in SDDs. Several reports suggest that, during expression recognition, high-functioning individuals with autism look less at the eye region (e.g., [@B63]; [@B25]) or the inner facial features (eyes, nose, and mouth; [@B48]; [@B8]) than controls, or do not effectively use information from the upper-face when decoding expressions ([@B78]; [@B43]).

Conclusion
==========

While patient-based evidence supporting the independence of facial identity and expression processing was almost entirely discounted by [@B21], more recent neuropsychological case studies have provided more convincing evidence supporting the independence hypothesis, particularly when accompanied by neuroanatomical data. Yet, reliance on recognition performance alone can clearly obscure atypicalities in the use of diagnostic visual information in both identity and expression recognition; and the use of dynamic and static information should be assessed in both processes, at both perceptual and mnemonic levels. When tested appropriately, neurological patients can provide invaluable contributions to theoretical debates such as the independence hypothesis. Although suitable patients are rare, supporting evidence may also be gleaned from more readily available developmental cases. While some authors have discounted the contribution of these individuals on theoretical grounds, observation of similar patterns of performance across acquired and developmental disorders would ultimately provide more convincing insights into the independence debate.
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